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Modern-day professional athletes have the ability to earn 
extremely high annual salaries. With the average Major League 
Baseball (“MLB”) and National Basketball Association (“NBA”) 
franchises being valued at over one-and-a-half billion dollars1, 
 
* Steven R. Vignola is a third-year law student at Elisabeth Haub School of 
Law at Pace University, where he serves as an Articles Group Editor for PACE 
LAW REVIEW. Philippians 4:13. Mr. Vignola would like to thank his family and 
loved ones for all of their encouragement and support. He would also like to 
offer special thanks to Professor Linda Fentiman, the faculty advisor who 
supervised the writing of this Article. 
1  Kurt Badenhausen, NBA Team Values 2018: Every Club Now Worth at 
Least $1 Billion, Forbes (Feb. 7, 2018, 9:57 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2018/02/07/nba-team-values-
2018-every-club-now-worth-at-least-1-billion/#7643eb771558; Mike Ozanian, 
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the average National Football League (“NFL”) franchise being 
valued at over two-and-a-half billion dollars2, and the average 
National Hockey League (“NHL”) franchise being valued at 
almost six hundred million dollars3, there are ample funds from 
which the professional sports franchises can pay their athletes.  
As such, a professional athlete is normally able to negotiate a 
multi-million dollar salary with the professional franchise that 
owns the player’s playing rights.  In many situations, after a 
player signs a contract with the franchise, the two sides proceed 
without incident: the player performs under the contract to its 
term, and the team pays the player pursuant to the contract. 
However, circumstances sometimes arise in which either 
the player believes the contract he signed with the franchise no 
longer reflects the salary to which he believes he is entitled; the 
player wishes to extend the term of the contract; or the player 
no longer wishes to play for the franchise which retains the 
player’s playing rights.4  When a player feels this way, the player 
usually refuses to play his respective sport under the terms of 
the original contract in the hope that he can gain the new terms 
he desires by “holding out.”5  Because the players who take such 
action are important to their team,6 the franchise often has no 
choice but to acquiesce to the new contract terms7 or to make an 
unwanted trade of the player.8 
 
2  Forbes Staff Leadership, Forbes Releases 21st Annual NFL Team 
Valuations, FORBES (Sept. 20, 2018, 11:48 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbespr/2018/09/20/forbes-releases-21st-annual-
nfl-team-valuations/#6db0103f7af4. 
3  Mike Ozanian, The NHL’s Most Valuable Teams 2017, FORBES (Dec. 5, 
2017, 9:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2017/12/05/the-
nhls-most-valuable-teams-4/#593db34017c7. 
4  See Basil M. Loeb, Deterring Player Holdouts: Who Should Do It, How 
to Do It, and Why It Has to Be Done, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 275, 275 (2001). 
5  Id. 
6  Id. at 276. 
7  Id. at 277. 
8  See ESPN, Jimmy Butler Demand Led to ‘Negative Environment,’ 
Wolves’ Owner Says, ESPN (Nov. 18, 2018), 
http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/25283567/glen-taylor-minnesota-
timberwolves-owner-addresses-trade-jimmy-butler-philadelphia-76ers 
(reporting on Minnesota Timberwolves former star player Jimmy Butler, who 
stated he would no longer play for the Timberwolves—even after the 
Timberwolves owner attempted to persuade Butler to stay and play for the 
team—which forced the Timberwolves to reluctantly trade Butler to the 
Philadelphia 76ers in exchange for Robert Covington, Dario Saric, Jerryd 
Bayless, and a 2022 second-round draft pick). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/7
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The overall purpose of this Article is to determine what 
recourse a professional sports franchise has when a player under 
contract with the franchise refuses to play pursuant to their 
agreement.  First, this Article will explain what a player hold 
out is and the additional underlying factors that lead to players 
holding out, including the problems the player’s hold out creates 
for the team, the franchise, and the fans.  Next, the Article will 
examine whether a player hold out constitutes a breach of 
contract, which would permit the franchise to seek recourse.  
Additionally, if a breach has occurred, this Article will assess the 
remedies a franchise can seek as a result of the player’s breach 
of contract.  This Article will then address which contractual 
remedy is most realistic at present.  Finally, this Article will 
suggest how the franchises may seek to prevent or mitigate 
future hold outs, either through the leagues’ adoption of a 
system of binding arbitration to settle disputes or through “self-
help specific performance.” 
 
II. What Are Player “Hold Outs,” Why Do They Occur, and 
What Problems Do They Create? 
 
The process of “holding out” is refusing to go along with 
others in a concerted action or failing to come to an agreement.9  
A “holdout” is an individual who delays signing a contract in 
hopes of gaining more favorable terms.10  Thus, for our purposes, 
a holdout can be understood as a professional athlete who 
refuses to come to an agreement until the franchise gives the 
athlete the consideration the athlete seeks.  Former NFL head 
coach and current NBC football analyst, Tony Dungy, indicated 
his understanding that there are a myriad of reasons modern 
professional athletes hold out.11  Dungy says that because the 
careers of NFL players are so short,12 the players need to “take 
 
9  Hold Out, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/hold%20out (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
10  Holdout, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/holdout 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
11  Scott Davis, Tony Dungy Explains the Simple Reason Why NFL players 
Hold Out for New and Bigger Contracts, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 9, 2018, 5:19 
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/tony-dungy-nfl-player-contract-
holdouts-2018-8. 
12  See John Keim, With Average NFL Career 3.3 Years, Players Motivated 
to Complete MBA Program, ESPN (July 29, 2016), 
3
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advantage of [their earning capacity] while [they] can.”13  At the 
same time, because of the injury risks inherent in professional 
sports—especially in the NFL—players are under the constant 
threat of sustaining a career-ending injury.  Sustaining a career-
ending injury, or sustaining an injury which may inhibit a player 
from utilizing an attribute the player brings to the team (e.g., 
speed, arm strength, shooting ability), may restrict the player 
from reaching his maximum earning potential if the player can 
no longer offer value to the franchise.14  Therefore, because of 
the ever-present risk of injury, a player is incentivized to hold 
out so that the player can accrue the highest possible salary. 
Another concern players face is that there are a finite 
number of years in which each player can earn top dollar.  One’s 
“prime” is the most attractive, thriving, or satisfying stage or 
period of one’s life or career.15  When a player is said to be in his 
prime, the player is typically producing at the highest possible 
level that the player is capable of achieving.  Elias Sports 
Bureau estimates that a player hits his prime at the age of 
twenty-nine in the MLB, twenty-seven in the NHL, and twenty-
six in the NBA and NFL.16  A player’s prime can be as short as 
one season17 or spread across multiple seasons.  Of course, there 
are players who are outliers that can produce at a high level for 
many years.18  Nevertheless, in an ideal situation, a player 
 
http://www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/207780/current-and-former-nfl-
players-in-the-drivers-seat-after-completing-mba-program (citing NFL 
Players’ Association).  To Tony Dungy’s point, the average NFL career lasts 3.3 
years. 
13  Davis, supra note 11. 
14  Id. 
15  Prime, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2016). 
16  ESPN Stats & Info, Average Age in Esports vs. Major Sports, ESPN 
(Sept. 17, 2017), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/20733853/the-
average-age-esports-versus-nfl-nba-mlb-nhl. 
17   For example, in the 2005–2006 NHL season, San Jose Sharks twenty-
five-year-old forward, Jonathan Cheechoo, scored fifty-six goals and won the 
Maurice “Rocket” Richard Trophy as the league’s top goal scorer.  See Jonathan 
Cheechoo, HOCKEY REFERENCE, https://www.hockey-
reference.com/players/c/cheecjo01.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).  Due to 
injuries and decline, however, Cheechoo never got close to his award-winning 
pace ever again and retired from the NHL after the 2009–2010 season.  See id. 
18   For example, hockey legend and 1972 Hockey Hall of Fame Inductee 
Gordie Howe played in the NHL at a high level from the age of twenty-one, 
when Howe scored sixty-eight points and made his second All-Star appearance, 
until the age of forty-nine, when Howe accounted for ninety-six points. See 
Gordie Howe, HOCKEY REFERENCE, https://www.hockey-
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/7
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would, upon completing his initial contract (whether it be an 
entry-level contract,19 a rookie contract,20 or ceasing to be 
arbitration eligible),21 sign a contract with a team in their prime 
years to attain their maximum earning potential.  However, 
because players hit their primes at different times22—and 
because there is a conflict of interest between the team, which 
 
reference.com/players/h/howego01.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
19  An entry-level contract (“ELC”) is signed by players that are younger 
than twenty-five years old and who seek to play in the NHL.  Collective 
Bargaining Agreement Between National Hockey League and National 
Hockey League Players’ Association, Art. 9.1(b) (Feb. 15, 2013), 
https://cdn.nhlpa.com/img/assets/file/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf 
[hereinafter NHL CBA].  If a player between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
one signs an ELC, the contract must be for three years; if a player that is 
twenty-two or twenty-three years old signs an ELC, the contract must be for 
two years; and if the player is twenty-four years old or older, the ELC can only 
be for one year.  Id. 
20  NFL and NBA players each sign rookie contracts after they are drafted 
to play in each league, respectively.  Collective Bargaining Agreement Between 
National Football League and National Football League Players Association, 
Art. 7(3)(a) (Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/NFLPA/CBA2020/NFL
-NFLPA_CBA_March_5_2020.pdf  [hereinafter NFL CBA].  In the NFL, the 
duration of a rookie contract ranges between three and five years, depending 
on when (or if) the player was drafted.  Id.  If the player was drafted in the first 
round of their draft, the contract would be for four years with a fifth-year 
option; if the player was drafted in rounds two through seven of their draft 
year, the contract was for four years; if the player was not drafted, the contract 
would be for three years.  Id.  In the NBA, a player signs a rookie contract for 
two years with team options to keep the player under contract for the third and 
fourth years in the NBA.  Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the 
National Basketball Association and the National Basketball Association 
Players’ Association, Art. 8(1)(a) (Jan. 19, 2017), https://cosmic-
s3.imgix.net/3c7a0a50-8e11-11e9-875d-3d44e94ae33f-2017-NBA-NBPA-
Collective-Bargaining-Agreement.pdf [hereinafter NBA CBA]. 
21  After a player has played in the MLB for six years or more, the player 
no longer must submit to binding arbitration with his club and can become a 
free agent.  Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Major League Baseball 
and Major League Baseball Players’ Association, Art. XX(B)(1) (2017), 
https://d39ba378-ae47-4003-86d3-
147e4fa6e51b.filesusr.com/ugd/b0a4c2_95883690627349e0a5203f61b93715b5.
pdf  [hereinafter MLB CBA]. 
22  For example, veteran Boston Bruins goaltender Tim Thomas did not 
hit his prime years until his mid-to-late thirties.  See Tim Thomas, HOCKEY 
REFERENCE, https://www.hockey-reference.com/players/t/thomati01.html.  In 
fact, Thomas won his first Vezina Trophy, as the NHL’s best goaltender, at the 
age of 34, which is an age when many other NHL goaltenders begin their 
decline.  Id.  Thomas later followed this up two years later by again winning 
the Vezina Trophy, claiming the Conn Smythe trophy as the 2011 NHL 
Playoffs MVP, and becoming a champion by hoisting the Stanley Cup.  Id. 
5
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seeks to sign the player for the lowest possible sum for the 
shortest possible term, and the player, who seeks to attain the 
greatest salary for the longest term23—such an equilibrium is 
rarely struck.  Thus, it becomes more likely that as the term of 
a contract progresses, the franchise or the player is likely to 
want to get out of the agreement: either because the franchise 
sees the player as too costly for the value that the player 
provides, or because the player feels he is not being paid enough.  
In some professional sports leagues, franchises have several 
options for recourse, including: ending contracts that, in 
hindsight, turn out to be unwise investments by “buying out” a 
player’s contract24; cutting a player because the contract is not a 
guaranteed contract25; or, if a player has a guaranteed contract, 
a franchise may still cut a player so long as the franchise pays 
the player the remainder of the money the player is entitled to 
under the contract.26 While there are steps franchises can take 
when a contract with a player turns out to be a bad investment, 
the players have little recourse when they feel undervalued.27  
When a player feels this way, his only options essentially become 
to request a trade or to request a new contract.28  And if the 
player’s request for a new contract is not granted, the player’s 
remaining options are to hold out or play under a contract that 
they feel does not reflect their true value. 
A player’s hold out can be felt at various levels of the 
 
23  Loeb, supra note 4, at 275. 
24  For example, in the NHL, when a team “buys out” a player either by 
an “ordinary course” buyout—where the team buys out the player and the 
bought out player’s salary counts against the cap for twice the remaining 
length of the contract—or by “compliance” buyout, the team is permitted to pay 
the bought out player two-thirds of the player’s remaining salary over twice 
the remaining length of the contract.  See NHL CBA, supra note 19, at Art. 
50.9(i).  Compliance buyouts, however, do not count against a team’s salary 
cap.  Id.  In both “buy out” situations, the buyout team is still mandated to pay 
the remainder of the buyout player’s salary.  Id. 
25  For example, in the NFL, a player contract can be terminated if the 
team determines that “the player . . . is anticipated to make less of a 
contribution to the Club’s ability to compete on the playing field than another 
player.”  NFL CBA, supra note 20, at Art. 4(5)(d). 
26  For example, in the MLB, players are guaranteed to receive the salary 
agreed to in the contract regardless of whether the player’s contract is 
terminated or not.  MLB CBA, supra note 21, at Appendix A: Major League 
Uniform Player’s Contract, ¶ 2. 
27  See Loeb, supra note 4, at 275. 
28  Id. at 279. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/7
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franchise.  However, the most affected parties—both in terms of 
power to end the hold out and the parties who stand to lose the 
most from the hold out—are the owner and the franchise’s 
management (collectively, “management”). Management can, of 
course, end a hold out by acquiescing to the player’s demand of 
giving the player a new contract or trading the player to a 
different team.  However, these are not attractive options 
because of the dangerous precedent it sets for the franchise’s 
future dealings.29  On the other hand, should management refuse 
to end the hold out, management may suffer other consequences. 
One such consequence may be speculation by the sports media 
as to why management has not ended the hold out.30 While the 
sports media are doing this, they may also be casting a negative 
image of the franchise to its audience. 
Another consequence may include a decrease of fan support 
and involvement with the franchise.  When a player holds out 
and refuses to play for his team unless his demands are met, 
that player’s fans are denied the opportunity to watch their star 
player play for their favorite team.31  Because the player who 
withholds his services is typically valuable to his team,32 the 
player’s hold out has a negative effect on the team’s 
performance.33  Moreover, because the team may not be as good, 
there is less incentive for fans of the franchise to attend games, 
follow the team’s progress, or make purchases related to the 
franchise such as concessions at games and team paraphernalia.  
The impact of the player hold out spreads through various levels 
of the franchise: from management, to the team, and, ultimately, 
 
29  See, e.g., Sheil Kapadia, Kam Chancellor Ends Contract Holdout, 
Returns to Seahawks, ESPN (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/13722598/kam-chancellor-end-contract-
holdout-return-seattle-seahawks. (reporting on Seattle Seahawk Kam 
Chancellor’s hold out from his contract for eight weeks during the 2015 NFL 
season until he received the new contract he desired); Herbie Teope, Earl 
Thomas Rejoins Seattle Seahawks After Holdout, NFL (Sept. 5, 2018, 12:19 
PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000958380/article/earl-thomas-
rejoins-seattle-seahawks-after-holdout (reporting that less than three years 
later, fellow Seahawk and friend of Kam Chancellor, Earl Thomas, also held 
out from his contract; unlike Chancellor, though, Thomas did not miss any 
regular season games). 
30  Loeb, supra note 4, at 279, n. 24.  
31  Id. at 277. 
32  Id. at 276. 
33  Id. at 277. 
7
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to the fans.  Thus, when a player holds out, it creates a ripple 
effect that results in fans suffering the repercussions. 
Player hold outs are divisive and affect not only the 
relationship between the player and the franchise’s 
management, but also the player’s teammates and the 
franchise’s fans.  When a player holds out from his contract, the 
player creates a tumultuous atmosphere that affects the overall 
team dynamic and the other players on the team.  An example 
of this can be seen from the handling of a former star player, 
Jimmy Butler, by the NBA’s Minnesota Timberwolves in 2018.  
Prior to the Timberwolves trading Butler, who was holding out 
from his contract, Butler made an appearance at the 
Timberwolves’ practice on October 10, 2018.34  During that 
practice, Butler gathered members of the Timberwolves third 
team players to play on his team,35 faced off against high-profile 
members of the Timberwolves in mini, inter-squad scrimmages, 
and proceeded to berate young stars Karl-Anthony Towns and 
Andrew Wiggins.36  During the scrimmage, Butler told Towns 
and Wiggins that “[Towns and Wiggins] ain’t [sic] [expletive]!”; 
and, referring to Towns specifically, said, “[Towns] can’t do 
[expletive] against me!”37  On top of Butler’s negative comments, 
Butler also continued acting in an antagonistic manner that was 
not conducive to building positive team chemistry.38  As the 
practice continued, it became apparent that Butler’s comments 
bothered Towns and added additional vitriol to Butler’s hold out 
situation with Timberwolves’ management.39  Butler 
intentionally created this negative atmosphere, and the effect of 
his comments and demeanor towards his teammates was to let 
the Timberwolves know that, if the team did not acquiesce to 
Butler’s trade demand, Butler would continue his negative, 
 
34  Jon Krawczynski & Shams Charania, Jimmy Butler Returns to Bring 
More Chaos to the Wolves, Just as He Promised, ATHLETIC (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://theathletic.com/580655/2018/10/11/jimmy-butler-return-timberwolves-
chaos-tom-thibodeau-trade-request/. 
35  Id. 
36  Chris Haynes, Sources: Karl-Anthony Towns, Andrew Wiggins Primary 
Targets of Jimmy Butler’s Practice Insults, YAHOO SPORTS (Oct. 10, 2018, 6:06 
PM), https://sports.yahoo.com/sources-karl-anthony-towns-andrew-wiggins-
primary-targets-jimmy-butlers-practice-insults-220611226.html.  
37  Id. 
38  See Krawczynski & Charania, supra note 34. 
39  Id. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/7
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antagonistic behavior.40  This example illustrates that while a 
holdout is still participating with the team, he can create an 
environment that is detrimental to the team atmosphere and 
essentially force the organization’s hand: either acquiesce to the 
player’s demands, or suffer the negativity the player may bring 
to the team culture.  In the Butler example, Butler was traded 
to the Philadelphia 76ers in return for three players and a draft 
pick, which did not accurately reflect Butler’s value as a player.41 
 
III. When a Player Holds Out, Does That Constitute a Breach 
of Contract? 
 
For there to be an enforceable contract, there must be a 
manifestation of mutual assent,42  consideration,43 and no 
defenses that can affect the enforceability of the contract.44  The 
bargain struck between the franchise and the player is an 
exchange of promises45: the franchise promises to pay the player 
for the term of the contract in exchange for the player’s promise 
to play pursuant to the terms of the contract.  When a player 
holds out from his contract, the hold out affects the 
manifestation of assent of the original agreement between the 
player and the franchise.46  When performance of a duty under 
 
40  Id. 
41  See ESPN, supra note 8. 
42  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  See 
also Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 778–79 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1907) (“[I]t is said that the meeting of minds, which is essential 
to the formation of a contract, is not determined by the secret intention of the 
parties, but by their expressed intention, which may be wholly at variance with 
the former.”). 
43  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  See, 
e.g., Ala. Football, Inc. v. Wright, 452 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (holding 
that a football player’s contracted-for performance is valuable consideration in 
a sports contract). 
44  Common defenses against an otherwise enforceable contract include: 
illegality of the subject matter; incapacity; mistake (both mutual and 
unilateral); fraud; duress; undue influence; impossibility; violation of statute 
of frauds; and public policy concerns.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS §§ 12–16, 110, 151–53, 159–64, 174–78, 208, 261 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
45  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  See 
generally Wright, 452 F. Supp. at 182. 
46  The two parties (the player and the franchise) would have already 
manifested their assent to comply with the terms of the contract when the 
contract is signed.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. LAW 
9
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a contract is due, any non-performance is a breach.47  The 
“performance of a duty,” in the context of a player contract, 
would be for the player to play for the franchise for the term of 
the contract.  When this performance fails to occur at the time it 
becomes due, the player is in breach of contract. 
Furthermore, the player’s breach may be a material breach.  
Determining if a material breach has occurred is significant 
because, if the player’s breach of contract with his franchise is a 
material breach, the uncured material performance not only 
entitles the non-breaching party to recover damages, but 
permits the non-breaching party to suspend its own performance 
due under the contract.48  When determining whether a material 
breach has occurred, the injured party (here, the franchise) 
considers circumstances including: the extent to which the 
injured party is deprived of the benefit the party reasonably 
expected to receive; and the extent to which the injured party 
can be adequately compensated for the part of the benefit which 
he will be deprived.49  The party failing to perform (here, the 
holdout) evaluates circumstances including: the extent to which 
the party failing to perform will suffer forfeiture; the likelihood 
that the party failing to perform will cure his failure; and the 
extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform 
comports with the standard of good faith and fair dealing, which 
is implied in every contract.50  When a hold out occurs, the 
 
INST. 1981). 
47  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  See 
Kehm Corp. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 620, 625 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (holding that 
defendant’s failure to timely procure an essential component of plaintiff’s 
product constituted breach of contract). 
48  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  See 
also Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921) (where a 
construction company installed “Cohoes” pipes instead of “Reading” pipes in 
part of a house, and the pipes are similar in nearly every aspect except for the 
name, the homeowner breached the contract with the construction company by 
refusing to pay the remaining balance after the house was constructed. The 
New York Court of Appeals held that, though the construction company 
breached the contract by failing to install “Reading” pipe, the breach was not 
material, and since the construction company substantially performed the rest 
of the contract, the homeowner was ordered to pay the balance.). 
49  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  See 
N. Helex Co. v. United States, 455 F.2d 546, 553 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (stating that, in 
determining loss of benefit to the injured party, all relevant circumstances 
must be considered). 
50  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  See 
Prescott & Co., Ltd. v. J.B. Powles & Co., 193 P. 680, 681-82 (Wash. 1920) 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/7
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franchise: (1) is completely deprived of the player’s promised 
performance under the contract, due to the player’s abstinence 
from playing for the franchise; and (2) cannot be compensated 
by the holdout, except to the extent that the franchise may be 
able to withhold payments the player would have been entitled 
to had the player performed pursuant to the contract.  The 
player holding out, conversely: (1) may suffer salary forfeiture 
which the franchise would otherwise be obligated to pay the 
player under the contract; (2) is unlikely to cure his failure to 
perform until the player either obtains his new contract or is 
traded to a team that will give the player such a contract; and 
(3) is not behaving in a way that comports with the standards of 
good faith and fair dealing that are implied in the contract 
because the player is refusing to play for the term of the contract 
until his demands are met.  While the player may stand to forfeit 
the salary he would otherwise be entitled to if the player did not 
hold out, in the analysis of whether a breach of contract is 
material, most of the significant factors suggest that the hold out 
has a negative effect on the franchise.  Furthermore, because the 
player’s contract is a performance contract (for the player to play 
for the franchise), the player’s failure to render his performance 
when his performance would be due would force the franchise to 
forfeit the benefit of its bargain and leave the franchise with an 
uncured failure by the player (the breaching party).  Thus, when 
a player holds out from his contract, the hold out is a material 
breach of contract. 
Professor Alex M. Johnson, Jr. argued that player hold outs 
constitute a breach of contract, and that the theory of 
“opportunistic behavior,” which has not been recognized to 
encompass breaches of contract, should be expanded to include 
professional athlete hold outs.51  Professor Johnson notes that 
the theory of opportunistic behavior has traditionally been 
 
(demonstrating that the party who committed material breach was not entitled 
to payment under the contract after the non-breaching party refused to pay for 
the goods contracted for; the breaching party thereby suffered the forfeiture of 
the goods). 
51  See generally Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Argument for Self-Help Specific 
Performance: Opportunistic Renegotiation of Player Contracts, 22 CONN. L. 
REV. 61 (1989) (arguing, generally, that professional sports franchises should 
be able to acquiesce to a holdout’s demand and later sue the holdout for the 
difference between the original salary and the holdout’s new salary, under the 
theory of economic duress.). 
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defined as behavior that does not rise to a breach of contract, but 
occurs when a party acts in a manner that is “contrary to the 
other party’s understanding of their contract, but not necessarily 
contrary to the agreement’s explicit terms, leading to a transfer 
of wealth from the other party to the performer . . . .”52  In 
Professor Johnson’s view, this is the type of behavior that courts 
and society should endeavor to curtail.53  Professor Johnson uses 
the example of Eric Dickerson, the former star running back for 
the Los Angeles Rams in the NFL, to illustrate how 
opportunistic behavior by a player leaves essentially no remedy 
to the other party to the contract, the team who employs the 
player.54  Dickerson held out twice from the Rams: once in 1985, 
and, again, from 1987 through October of 1988.55  Both times, he 
used his position as a star player to leverage better contract 
terms.56  Professor Johnson argued that, though this behavior is 
of the variety that society would not find acceptable, there is, 
presently, no effective remedy whereby the franchise can 
effectively counteract the holdout’s behavior.57 
Professor Johnson adds further credence to the view that 
when a player holds out from his contract, he has breached his 
contract.  In each of the major professional sports league’s 
present collective bargaining agreements, the sample contracts 
attached to those agreements indicate that the player must play 
for the team which holds the player’s playing rights.58  
Therefore, when the player fails to play, or the player does not 
perform when the player promised to, a breach of contract has 
occurred.59  And because the performance was an essential term 
of the contract, the failure to perform makes the nonperformance 
a material breach because the franchise, as the injured party, is 
 
52  Id. at 74 (citing Timothy Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law 
of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 522 (1981)). 
53  Johnson, supra note 51, at 73. 
54  Id. at 70–72. 
55  Id. at 71–72. 
56  Id.  When Dickerson held out the second time, the Rams were left no 
other choice than to trade Dickerson to the Indianapolis Colts after Dickerson 
“implied that his dispute with Los Angeles had taken such a toll on him that 
he might not be able to give his all on the field.”  Id. at 71. 
57  Id. at 73–74. 
58  See generally MLB CBA, supra note 21, at Appendix A, cl. 1; NBA CBA, 
supra note 20, at Exhibit A, cl. 2; NFL CBA, supra note 20, at App. A, cl. 2; 
NHL CBA, supra note 19, at Exhibit 1, cl. 2. 
59  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/7
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completely deprived of the player’s performance as a result of 
the hold out, and the franchise has no recourse aside from 
withholding the player’s salary. 
The player’s breach of contract by engaging in a hold out 
may also be a partial breach, which would still allow the 
franchise to recover.  A partial breach of contract is less 
significant than a material breach because a partial breach does 
not necessarily render the entire contract inoperable but, 
instead, gives the aggrieved party a right to damages by a small 
reduction in payment or other adjustment.60  A partial breach 
claim is for damages based on only part of the injured party’s 
remaining rights to performance.61  This means that if the 
injured party elects to, or is required to, await the balance of the 
other party’s performance under the contract, the injured party’s 
claim is said instead to be one for damages for partial breach.62  
The injured party can maintain a partial breach action at once, 
but the party is not permitted to stop further performance by the 
wrongdoer and get damages for the anticipated future non-
performance, as well as for the past non-performance 
constituting the partial breach.63  Section 236 of the Second 
Restatement of Contracts provides a helpful demonstration of a 
partial breach: 
 
A contracts with B to build a building on B’s land, 
work to commence on May 1 and to be completed 
by October 1.  On May 10, A has not yet 
commenced work.  If the court concludes that A’s 
breach, although material, has not continued for 
such a length of time that B is discharged, B has 
a claim against A for damages caused by the 
delay, but this is not a claim for damages based on 
all of B’s remaining rights to performance.  B’s 
claim is one for damages for partial breach.64 
 
 
60  Partial Breach Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/partial-breach (last visited Feb. 24, 2020). 
61  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 236(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
62  Id. at § 236, cmt. b. 
63  10 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 53.4 (2019). 
64  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 236, illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
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Here, the franchise, as the injured party, is entitled to the 
holdout’s full performance under the contract.  So, when the 
player holds out, the franchise instantly has a cause of action 
against the holdout because the holdout’s delay in performance 
will have harmed the franchise.  The franchise may choose to 
wait before suing the holdout, even though the franchise is 
entitled to recovery once the breach occurs, because, if the player 
commits total breach,65 the franchise would be discharged from 
its remaining promises made to the player under the contract.66  
A total breach is defined as “one that so substantially impairs 
the value of the contract to the injured party at the time of the 
breach that it is just in the circumstances to allow him to recover 
damages based on all his remaining rights to performance.”67  
Furthermore, if the contract is repudiated and the player refuses 
to perform,68 the franchise is able to successfully bring an action 
for total breach.  However, very few professional athlete 
holdouts would ever rise to the level of a total breach.  Players 
who have contracts with their franchise typically would commit 
a total breach only if they are seeking to breach their contract 
and play in another league in another country.69  But even then, 
the franchise can seek a negative injunction against the player 
to restrict the player’s ability to play elsewhere.70  In sum, 
generally, when the player holds out by simply not performing 
when performance becomes due, the franchise is instantly 
entitled to recover for the player’s partial breach, should the 
franchise elect to do so.71 
 
 
65  Id. at § 243, cmt. B. 
66  See id. at § 243(1). 
67  First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 765, 799 
(Fed. Cl. 2009). 
68  See Fox v. Dehn, 116 Cal. Rptr. 786, 790-91(Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (holding 
that a total repudiation combined with the nonperformance by the breaching 
party necessitated the injured parties to bring action immediately while the 
breaching party was still alive; once the breaching party died, the injured 
parties no longer had a cause of action for either total or partial breach). 
69  See, e.g., Mike Mazzeo, Ilya Kovalchuk Leaves $77M on Table, ESPN 
(July 11, 2013), http://espn.go.com/new-york/nhl/story/_/id/9470677/ilya-
kovalchuk-new-jersey-devils-announces-retire (reporting on then-NHL star 
Ilya Kovalchuk’s total breach of his fifteen-year contract after playing under 
the contract’s terms for only three seasons; Kovalchuk “retired” from the NHL 
so that he could play in the KHL, a league in Kovalchuk’s native Russia). 
70  See infra notes 88–93. 
71  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 378 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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IV. What Remedy is Available to the Franchise When a Player 
Holds Out? 
 
As it has been established that the actions of a professional 
athlete who holds out from his contract can give rise to either a 
material or partial breach, it is next necessary to determine 
what remedy or remedies the franchise can seek as damages.  
There are three main contractual “interests” available when a 
party breaches: (1) expectation; (2) reliance; and (3) restitution 
interests.72  Recovering expectation damages would entitle the 
injured party to receive the “benefit of his bargain,” or, in other 
words, to be put in as good a position as he would have been in 
had the contract been performed.73  Reliance damages, on the 
other hand, reimburse the injured party for any losses caused by 
relying on the contract.74  This is achieved by putting the injured 
party in as good a position as he would have been had the 
contract not been made.75  The final contractual remedy 
available to the non-breaching party is restitution damages, 
which restores to the injured party any benefit the injured party 
conferred on the breaching party.76 
Expectation damages, though the most desirable remedy to 
the franchise who possesses the holdout’s playing rights, are 
unlikely to be awarded to the franchise in a breach of contract 
action.  As stated above, in a player’s contract, the franchise 
promises to pay the player a specified amount of money in 
exchange for the player’s promise to play pursuant to the 
contract.  Thus, the franchise’s benefit of its bargain, as it relates 
to player contracts, is for the player to play under the terms of 
the original agreement.  However, there are multiple issues 
facing the franchise if it were to seek expectation damages when 
a player holds out.  First, there is a lack of reasonable certainty 
as to what the value the franchise would receive under the 
contract had the contract been performed.  The term 
“consequential damages” is often used with respect to harm 
suffered as a “consequence” of the breach of duty, but not as a 
 
72  Id. at § 344.  See § 344, illustration 2 for an example on how each 
interest is computed. 
73  Id. at § 344(a). 
74  Id. at § 344(b). 
75  Id. 
76  Id. at § 344(c). 
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direct, immediate, and foreseeable consequence.77  
Consequential damages differ from “direct” damages in that 
direct damages are foreseeable to any reasonable person in the 
position of the parties, whereas consequential damages are 
sometimes considered “special” damages because they may only 
be recovered if the breaching party (the holdout) is aware of 
special circumstances.78  When evidence cannot establish with 
reasonable certainty what the damages should be, the damages 
are not recoverable.79  In Atlantic City Associates, LLC v. Carter 
& Burgess Consultants, Inc.,80 the Third Circuit held that the 
difference between direct and consequential damages depends 
on whether the damages represent: (1) a loss in value of the 
other party’s performance, which are direct damages; or (2) 
collateral losses following the breach, which are consequential 
damages.81 
Here, the damages sustained by the franchise are 
consequential and not direct damages under the Atlantic City 
Associates test.82  While it is true that the franchise loses the 
value of the player’s performance, the player also loses the 
benefit of his salary.  Since both the franchise and the player 
lose their bargained for consideration when a hold out occurs, 
the hold out therefore constitutes a consequential breach.  This 
is because both the franchise and the holdout stand to lose 
something of value originally promised to each party under the 
contract: the franchise is forced to do without the player’s 
performance while the holdout is forced to go without his 
promised compensation.  However, the franchise would not be 
able to prove with reasonable certainty that the player holding 
out would be responsible for, say, a certain number of wins, 
which would subsequently contribute a certain sum of funds to 
the franchise’s coffers, had the player not held out.  Additionally, 
such a remedy, relating to a player’s absence to monetary 
damages sustained by the franchise, would also not be the 
“probable result of the breach when the contract was made”83 
 
77  11 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 56.6 (2018). 
78  Id. 
79  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
80  453 Fed. Appx. 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2011). 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
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because: (1) neither the player nor the franchise would have 
been able to anticipate how many wins the franchise would 
secure resulting from the player signing the contract; and (2) 
neither the player nor the franchise would have been able to 
anticipate how much money the franchise would be able to gain 
resulting from the player’s performance in securing each win at 
the time of the formation of the contract.  Similarly, it would be 
impossible for the franchise to prove with “reasonable certainty,” 
as the Restatement (Second) of Contracts requires, which profits 
were forfeited or which losses the franchise sustained resulting 
from the hold out.84  Thus, expectation damages, beyond some 
number measured by the player’s salary, cannot be awarded to 
the franchise when the potential damages are not reasonably 
certain or do not arise naturally out of the player’s breach85 (by 
holding out). 
The franchise could, however, pursue a negative injunction 
when a player holds out.  Courts have recognized that when an 
athlete threatens not to perform under their contract, a court 
may order a negative injunction to restrict the athlete from 
playing for another team.86  Under the Lumley v. Wagner 
doctrine, though employees cannot be forced to “produce as 
nearly as is practicable the same effect that the performance due 
under a contract would have produced,”87 the employees may be 
enjoined from working for a competitor.88  In Lumley, plaintiff 
Benjamin Lumley signed Johanna Wagner, an opera singer, to 
a performance contract for Wagner to perform at Lumley’s opera 
house in London.89  Wagner was later enticed to perform at the 
Royal Italian Opera, Covent Garden, by its owner, Frederick 
Gye.90  Wagner’s breach of contract prompted Lumley to sue, 
seeking to bar Wagner from appearing “anywhere on the London 
stage, rather than simply . . . [seeking] damages for breach of 
 
See also Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145. 
84  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
85  See Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 150. 
86  Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Affirmative Injunctions in Athletic 
Employment Contracts: Rethinking the Place of the Lumley Rule in American 
Sports Law, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 261, 262 (2006). 
87  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357, cmt. a. (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
88  See Lumley v. Wagner (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687. 
89  Id. at 688. 
90  Id. 
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contract.”91  The Lumley court refused to implement an 
affirmative injunction, stating it was “[b]eyond all doubt this 
Court could not interfere to enforce the specific performance of 
the whole contract.”92  However, the court stated a negative 
injunction—meaning a court-ordered restriction from Wagner 
singing at Gye’s theater—may be appropriate because the court 
“will not suffer the parties to depart from their contracts at their 
pleasure, leaving the party with whom they have contracted to 
the mere chance of any damages which the jury may give.”93 
Applying Lumley to professional athlete contract hold outs, 
courts cannot order players threatening to hold out to abide by 
the terms of their contract.  However, if the player holds out, the 
courts can order that the player cannot play for another team.  
Like Johanna Wagner in Lumley, professional athletes offer 
skills and attributes that are not easy to obtain, especially when 
a player produces at a high level.  This has led courts to treat 
professional athletes as “prima facie unique.”94  Accordingly, 
American courts have ordered negative injunctions on 
professional athletes seeking to breach their contract for more 
lucrative, enticing offers.95  Those courts have reasoned that 
because normal contractual remedies would be insufficient to 
protect the aggrieved party when a player under contract agrees 
to play for a rival team, a negative injunction can be awarded so 
that the team does not suffer great damage.96  The obvious 
 
91  Lea S. VanderVelde, The Gendered Origins of the Lumley Doctrine: 
Binding Men’s Consciences and Women’s Fidelity, 101 YALE L. J. 775, 792 
(1991). 
92  Lumley, 42 Eng. Rep. at 688. 
93  Id. 
94  Casey Duncan, Stealing Signs: Is Professional Baseball’s United States-
Japanese Player Contract Agreement Enough to Avoid Another “Baseball 
War”?, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 87, 107 (2003). 
95  See Rapp, supra note 86, at 266–67 (citing Phila. Ball Club, Ltd. v. 
Lajoie, 51 A. 973 (Pa. 1902) (holding that a star player like Lajoie cannot sign 
a contract with a rival team when his current team owns his rights and Lajoie’s 
salary demands were not met)).  See also Cent. N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 
181 N.E.2d 506, 517 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas, Cuyahoga Cty. 1961) (holding 
that “professional players in the major baseball, football, and basketball 
leagues have unusual talents and skills or they would not be so employed. Such 
players, the defendant Barnett included, are not easily replaced.”  Thus, when 
a rival basketball team sought to “woo” Barnett after he had already agreed to 
terms with the team who obtained his playing rights, the court issued a 
negative injunction from Barnett joining the team that subsequently wooed 
him). 
96  See Lajoie, 51 A. at 975; Barnett, 181 N.E.2d at 517. 
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drawback with negative injunctions, from management’s 
perspective, is that though the player cannot play for a rival 
franchise, the negative injunction does not necessitate the 
player to play for your franchise.  Therefore, while negative 
injunctions may be a useful tool for management when a holdout 
seeks to either play on another team or in another league, an 
injunction does not resolve the issues that come with a hold out 
because the player may still choose to not play at all. 
The franchise may also contend that, due to the uniqueness 
of the performance the player is contractually obligated to 
render, specific performance should be granted to protect the 
benefit of the franchise’s bargain.  Specific performance is a 
drastic remedy97 and is typically only granted when no other 
appropriate remedy is available.98  Generally, specific 
performance is granted only when the injured party has 
contracted for a unique good, such as real estate.99  Courts do not 
specifically enforce a contractual promise to render personal 
service,100 however, nor will courts enforce an injunction 
“against serving another if its probable result will be to compel 
a performance involving personal relations the enforced 
continuance of which is undesirable.”101  The refusal is based in 
part upon the “undesirability of compelling the continuance of 
personal association after disputes have arisen and confidence 
and loyalty are gone.”102  Further, compelling an individual to 
provide personal service raises public policy issues because an 
order to provide personal service violates the Thirteenth 
Amendment.103  Thus, the franchise will likely not be awarded 
specific performance when a player holds out from their contract 
because of constitutional concerns and the general position of 
 
97  See, e.g., LocusPoint Networks, LLC v. D.T.V. LLC, No. 14-cv-01278-
JSC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113356, at *57 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2015) (citing 
Estate of Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 1158 (Del. 2010)). 
98  See Van Wagner Advert. Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492 N.E.2d 756, 759 
(N.Y. 1986) (holding that when there are other adequate remedies available, 
specific performance will not be the remedy; however, it is possible for specific 
performance to be granted for real property). 
99  See Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U.S. 557, 571–72 (1869); Ash Park, LLC v. 
Alexander & Bishop, Ltd., 783 N.W.2d 294, 303–04 (Wis. 2010). 
100  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
101  Id. at § 367 cmt. b.  
102  Id. at § 367 cmt. a. 
103  See Loeb, supra note 4, at 287, n. 64 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIII). 
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courts not to grant specific performance of personal service 
contracts. 
Like expectation damages, reliance damages are also 
unlikely to be awarded to a franchise when a player holds out 
from his contract.  Reliance damages are calculated by 
identifying the expenditures made in preparation for 
performance, less any loss that the party in breach can prove 
with reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered 
had the contract been performed.104  An injured party is likely to 
pursue this remedy when he cannot prove his profit with 
reasonable certainty.105  As discussed in Section II, supra, when 
a player holds out, there will be effects on the franchise’s 
management, fans, and the team itself.  In this situation, it 
would be difficult to discern which expenditures were made in 
preparation specifically for the holdout, which would permit the 
franchise to recover reliance damages.  For example, assume an 
NHL franchise is expecting a player to serve as its starting 
goaltender.  Goaltender is an important position in hockey 
because having a quality goaltender can be the difference 
between missing the playoffs, making the playoffs, or winning 
the Stanley Cup.  Should that goaltender hold out from his 
contract, the NHL franchise would be unable to prove with 
reasonable certainty which expenditures the franchise made in 
relying on that player to be its goaltender in relation to the 
general expenditures the franchise would be making for the 
team.  As in the analysis for uncertainty with expectation 
damages, reliance damages are also unlikely to be awarded to 
the franchise because of the difficulty associated with 
determining the franchise’s expenditures made in preparation 
for the holdout’s performance.  Similarly, determining how a 
franchise would be “put in as good a position as [it] would have 
been in had the contract not been made” would be an equally 
difficult exercise because it cannot be said that all of the 
franchise’s expenses going into the season are made for the 
holdout. 
The final contractual remedy that may be available to a 
franchise when a player holds out is restitution damages.  
Restitution requires the party who received a benefit from the 
 
104  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
105  Id. at §349 cmt. a. 
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injured party to return that benefit to the injured party.106  
When a player holds out from his contract, the player is 
breaching his contract and injuring the franchise.  The 
computation of restitution in that case would be simple: by 
refusing to play, the benefit conferred on the player (the player’s 
salary) is to be returned to the franchise while the player is 
holding out.107  The reasoning makes sense: because the player 
is withholding his services to the franchise, the franchise is 
entitled to withhold paying the player his salary.  And, in the 
event the franchise has already paid the player either a portion 
or the entirety of his salary, the franchise is entitled to have the 
salary returned.  In fact, each major professional sports league 
in the United States—the MLB, NFL, NHL, and NBA—has such 
a rule stated either in its uniform player contracts108 or in the 
league’s collective bargaining agreement.109  It is therefore 
evident that the current, easiest-to-measure contractual remedy 
available to professional sports franchises is to withhold a 
player’s salary—or to be granted the right to have the salary the 
franchise has conferred on the holdout returned to the 
franchise—when the player holds out from his contract, because 
otherwise the player would be unjustly enriched. 
 
V. What Are Some Potential Actions Professional Sports 
Franchises Can Take to Deter or Mitigate Player Hold 
Outs? 
 
Though professional sports franchises may have the right to 
have the salary the franchise would otherwise be obligated to 
pay the player returned to the franchise’s coffers when the 
player holds out from his contract, or potentially receive a 
negative injunction prohibiting the holdout joining another 
franchise, this is far from ideal for the franchise.  The franchise 
 
106  Id. at § 370. 
107  Id. at § 371 cmt. a (“[A] party who is liable in restitution for a sum of 
money must pay an amount equal to the benefit that has been conferred upon 
him. If the benefit consists simply of a sum of money received by the party from 
whom restitution is sought, there is no difficulty in determining this amount.”). 
108  See MLB CBA, supra note 21, at Appendix A: Uniform Player’s 
Contract, ¶ 4(a); NBA CBA, supra note 20, at Exhibit A: National Basketball 
Association Uniform Player Contract, ¶ 9; NHL CBA, supra note 19, at Exhibit 
1: Standard Player’s Contract, ¶ 6. 
109  See NFL CBA, supra note 20, at Art. 4(9)(a). 
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would prefer the player to play for the franchise, help improve 
the performance of the team, and generate greater revenue for 
the franchise.  A hold out is not an ideal situation for the player 
either, considering that the player is not entitled to his salary 
because of his refusal to play; moreover, the player cannot play 
the sport in which he is a professional because doing so would 
result in the holdout’s acquiescence to his current rate of pay.  
There must be an alternative that could assist both parties to 
resolve their labor dispute and permit each party to receive at 
least a portion of the consideration each party would otherwise 
sacrifice as a result of a player hold out.  The best alternatives 
to a player hold out would be to either: (1) institute a system of 
binding arbitration when a player seeks to hold out from his 
current contract with the franchise that owns the player’s 
playing rights; or (2) implement a self-help specific performance 
remedy for the franchise.  Under a system of binding arbitration, 
the player and team would each submit its perceived value of the 
player to the arbitrator or arbitrators who would then choose one 
party’s proposal; and that decision would be binding on both 
parties.110 Under the self-help specific performance remedy, the 
franchise may acquiesce to the player’s new contract demand, 
and, subsequent to the full performance of the player, the 
franchise may challenge the modification by the player either on 
the basis that the modification was not supported by 
consideration or that the player made the franchise agree to the 
modification through economic duress.111 
 
A. Binding Arbitration 
 
Before delving into what a system of binding arbitration 
would look like in practice in professional sports, it is necessary 
to note that binding arbitrations will not have any effect unless 
these methods of dispute resolution become part of the collective 
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the league and the 
players’ association of that league.  Regarding a labor dispute 
between the East Coast Hockey League and the Professional 
Hockey Players’ Association, the Fourth Circuit held that 
 
110  Arbitration, A.B.A. 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeRes
olutionProcesses/arbitration/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2020). 
111  See Johnson, supra note 51, at 92–102. 
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“arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be 
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not 
agreed so to submit.”112  Therefore, because the CBA is the 
governing document between management and the labor union, 
it is necessary for each side to adopt the binding arbitration and 
self-help specific performance provisions into each league’s next 
CBA. Once adopted, those provisions would assist in resolving 
future hold outs, should hold outs remain a persistent problem 
in the future. 
When an arbitration provision has been adopted into a 
league’s CBA by a professional sports league and the players’ 
union, the parties agree in advance that any dispute between 
them that arises under the CBA will be submitted to an 
arbitrator instead of a court.113  Hence, both parties relinquish 
their rights to resort to the courts.114  Arbitration has become the 
dispute resolution process of choice within the professional 
sports industry because it is more informal, more expedient, 
allows for confidentiality of decisions, allows for input from both 
parties as to who will hear the case, and is less expensive than 
other forms of dispute resolution.115  The arbitration process is 
typically initiated when a player or the union notifies the club 
that they have a grievance against it.116  The term “grievance” is 
generally limited—either in practice or by contractual 
definition—to complaints involving conditions or conduct 
alleged to violate the contract.117  Under the typical grievance 
procedure, complaints unresolved at the first stage progress up 
through various levels of management and union 
representatives.118  The final step of the grievance procedure is 
typically arbitration, meaning a resolution of the dispute by an 
impartial third party.119  When arbitration is binding, the 
decision is final, can be enforced by a court, and can only be 
 
112  E. Coast Hockey League v. Prof’l Hockey Players Ass’n, 322 F.3d 311, 
314 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing AT&T Techs. Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 
U.S. 643, 648 (1986)). 
113  JAMES T. GRAY, 1 SPORTS L. PRAC. § 1.09(1)(a) (citing J. WEISTART & C. 
LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 408 (1979)). 
114  GRAY, supra note 113, at § 1.09(1)(a). 
115  Id. at § 1.09(1)(b) (citing WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 113, at 410).  
116  Id. at § 1.09(2)(a). 
117  Id. at § 1.09(2)(b). 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
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appealed on very narrow grounds.120  Each of the four main 
sports already has binding arbitration provisions in its CBA.121 
Since arbitration disputes in professional sports arise from 
grievances between professional athletes and the franchises who 
owns the athletes’ playing rights,122 the disputes pertaining to 
the players’ contracts to play implicate labor law.  Under labor 
law, the players have the right to unionize under the National 
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).123  Section VI of the NLRA 
recognizes that each professional players’ union has: (1) the 
right to self- organization; (2) the right to bargain collectively 
through representatives of the employees’ own choosing; and (3) 
the right to engage in concerted activities for employees’ mutual 
aid or protection.124  Each professional sports league has its own 
players’ union: the Major League Baseball Players’ Association 
(“MLBPA”) for the MLB; the National Basketball Players’ 
Association (“NBPA”) for the NBA; the National Football League 
Players’ Association (“NFLPA”) for the NFL; and the National 
Hockey League Players’ Association (“NHLPA”) for the NHL.125  
Though there are provisions regarding arbitration in each major 
professional sports league’s CBA, most of the salary disputes 
that go to arbitration occur when a player is without a contract, 
not when the player has a contract which the player does not 
deem reflective of his true value.126  For example, in the MLB 
and NHL, there is a period in each player’s career where each 
player is “arbitration eligible,” meaning that the player must go 
to arbitration with his team to resolve what the player’s salary 
will be for the upcoming season.127  There are currently no 
provisions in any professional sports league’s CBA pertaining to 
how a league will handle a player hold out.  Only one of the four 
 
120  See GRAY, supra note 113, at § 1.09. 
121  See MLB CBA, supra note 21, at Art. VI(E); NBA CBA, supra note 20, 
at Art. XXXI, XXXII; NFL CBA, supra note 20, at Art. 9(4), 26(4), 41(3), 43(6), 
44(7); NHL CBA, supra note 19, at Art. 17.5. 
122  GRAY, supra note 113, at § 1.09(3)(a). 
123  Id. at § 1.09(3)(b)(ii). 
124  29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
125  See generally MLB CBA, supra note 21; NBA CBA, supra note 20; NFL 
CBA, supra note 20; NHL CBA, supra note 19. 
126  See MLB CBA, supra note 21, at Art. XX(B)(1); NBA CBA, supra note 
20, at Art. XI, § 5(p); NFL CBA, supra note 20, at Art. 9(4); NHL CBA, supra 
note 19, at Art. 12. 
127  See MLB CBA, supra note 21, at Art. VI(E)(1); NHL CBA, supra note 
19, at Art. 12. 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol40/iss2/7
356 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 40.2 
major sports leagues, the NFL, even refers to a “hold out” (the 
process itself) or a “holdout” (the player conducting the hold out) 
in its most recent CBA.128  So while there are provisions which 
pertain to determining a player’s salary, those arbitration 
provisions apply only after the previous contract has expired—
not when a player disputes the amount of his salary. 
A major hurdle to incorporating into the CBA a provision 
which calls for binding arbitration when a player holds out is 
that professional athletes do not like going to arbitration.  For 
example, in early 2017, the New York Yankees of the MLB 
completed arbitration proceedings with star relief pitcher Dellin 
Betances.129  A relief pitcher is any pitcher who pitches in any 
inning—other than the ninth inning—after the starting pitcher 
leaves the game.  Closing pitchers, on the other hand, are 
normally the pitchers pitching in the ninth inning with the 
hopes that the pitcher will close out a win for his team.  
Betances, though he was not a closing pitcher, believed he was 
entitled to earn five million dollars—which is normally a closing 
pitcher’s salary—in the upcoming 2017 season.  Betances 
believed his value as a relief pitcher was akin to the value of 
what a closing pitcher would normally be.  The Yankees, on the 
other hand, believed Betances’ services were worth only three 
million dollars, which is on the higher-end of relief pitcher 
salaries.130  After a tumultuous arbitration process, the 
arbitrator ruled that Betances would be paid three million 
dollars for the 2017 season, thereby adopting the Yankees’ 
 
128  See sources cited supra note 126.  But see NFL CBA, supra note 20, at 
Art. 4(9)(a) (stating that a player commits Forfeitable Breach (i.e., the player 
forfeits a portion of the salary the player would otherwise be entitled to) when 
the player holds out from, or refuses to participate in practices or games). See 
also Art. 43 §§ 1, 6, 7 (stating that arbitration is to be conducted when there is 
a grievance “involving the interpretation of, application of, or compliance with, 
any provision of this Agreement, the NFL Player Contract, the Practice Squad 
Player Contract, or any applicable provision of the NFL Constitution and 
Bylaws or NFL Rules pertaining to the terms and conditions of employment of 
NFL players,” making it possible that player hold outs could be included as an 
arbitrable issue under the auspice of “interpretation of . . . the NFL Player 
Contract”). 
129  Billy Witz, Yankees’ Dellin Betances Loses in Arbitration, and a War 
of Words Begins, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/sports/baseball/yankees-dellin-betances-
arbitration-.html. 
130  Id. 
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salary request.131  After the arbitrator made his ruling, Yankees 
President Randy Levine told the media that Betances earned the 
correct salary because Betances was not a closing pitcher.132  
Levine stated, “[i]t’s like me saying, ‘I’m not the president of the 
Yankees; I’m an astronaut.’  No, I’m not an astronaut, and Dellin 
Betances is not a [closing pitcher].”133  Levine’s comments, 
combined with the arbitration process, made Betances upset.  
Betances said, “[t]hey take me in a room, and they trash me for 
about an hour and a half.  I thought it was unfair for me.  I feel 
like I’ve done a lot for this organization.”134  Betances’ 2017 
plight shed light on the divisiveness of the arbitration process 
and illustrated how arbitrations can lead to negative feelings by 
either the organization or the player.  Current MLB players are 
so arbitration-averse that many star players are signing 
contracts with their teams through their arbitration years135 to 
avoid the process.136  For these reasons, presenting a provision 
that mandates binding arbitration to a player’s union may not 
be a popular choice for resolving the labor disputes that arise 
when a player holds out. 
However, binding arbitration which would end a player’s 
hold out is clearly distinguishable from the current salary 
arbitrations that take place in professional sports.  Though it is 
true that binding arbitration to end a hold out and binding 
arbitration when a player does not have a contract both 
 
131  Id. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. 
135  Under the current MLB CBA, the franchise that owns the player’s 
playing rights retains six years of arbitration eligibility with that player.  MLB 
CBA, supra note 21, at Art. XX(B)(1).  After the player has accrued six years 
or more in MLB service time, the player no longer must submit to binding 
arbitration with his franchise and can become a free agent.  Id. 
136  For examples of notable MLB stars that have signed lucrative 
contracts to avoid arbitration, see Katherine Acquavella, Yankees, Luis 
Severino Avoid Arbitration With Four-Year, $40 Million Contract Extension, 
Reports Say, CBS SPORTS (Feb. 15, 2019, 12:12 PM), 
https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/yankees-luis-severino-avoid-arbitration-
with-four-year-40-million-contract-extension-reports-say/; Associated Press, 
Blake Snell, Rays Agree to $50 million, 5-Year Contract, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 
2019), 
http://stats.washingtonpost.com/mlb/story.asp?i=20190321153630838520708; 
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necessarily involve the possibility of a player earning a new 
salary, binding arbitration that ends a hold out would end the 
labor dispute over a current contract that the player has with 
the franchise and permit the player to play with his team again.  
This would make arbitration important—and potentially even 
necessary—when the player holding out is doing so as the new 
season approaches because arbitration would be the most 
expedient way of resolving the player’s salary dispute.  While 
the franchise may seek to maintain the position that the player 
should abide by the current contract, there is nothing to prevent 
the franchise from putting forth such a position in a binding 
arbitration proceeding.  There is a chance, though, that if the 
franchise takes that position, the arbitrator may deem that the 
player’s proposed salary is more reflective of the player’s value 
at the time of the arbitration.  Binding arbitration would 
therefore protect both management and the player when a 
player holds out.  The player would be protected because, if the 
player is truly deserving of a pay increase, the arbitrator will 
likely side with the player and award the player the salary the 
player desires.  Conversely, binding arbitration protects the 
franchise by giving a player one opportunity to make his case as 
to why he is deserving of a higher salary and, if the arbitrator 
does not accept the player’s proposal for a salary increase, then 
the franchise’s proposal for the player’s salary must be accepted.  
Thus, binding arbitration would bring both an expedient end to 
the hold out and remedy the player’s material breach. 
One of the criticisms to the binding arbitration approach is 
that there are no safeguards proposed which would prevent each 
player from holding out during a successful season or at the 
conclusion of a successful season.  The counter argument to the 
system proposed above would be that, once a player is achieving 
success, he will hold out and demand a higher salary and submit 
for binding arbitration.  However, additional language can be 
added to the binding arbitration provision which would either 
limit the frequency at which the players can hold out, by limiting 
the number of arbitrations each player is entitled to seek, or 
make it mandatory that a player must wait a certain amount of 
time before the player can seek binding arbitration again.  It is 
also worth noting that the arbitrator is not obligated to accept 
the player’s proposal when the player goes to binding 
arbitration.  Both the player and the franchise must make their 
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case as to why their side’s salary proposal best reflects the 
player’s salary.  Therefore, because there are alternatives 
available which would prevent potential abuses of the binding 
arbitration system, the system remains a viable option for 
professional sports leagues to adopt in their CBA.  Again, until 
the current CBAs for the MLB, NBA, NFL, and NHL expire, 
none of the leagues can adopt a binding arbitration system.  
However, the benefits that both the franchises and the players 
stand to gain from such a system being in place to resolve hold 
outs would outweigh the current system that essentially leaves 
one side, the franchise, without an adequate remedy. 
 
B. “Self-Help Specific Performance” 
 
Another adequate alternative is Professor Johnson’s 
suggestion of a “self-help specific performance” remedy, which 
he set forth in his article, The Argument for Self-Help Specific 
Performance: Opportunistic Renegotiation of Player Contracts.137  
The self-help remedy calls for the franchise to agree to the 
player’s opportunistic demand for renegotiation and then, after 
the player has fully performed, contest the modification and seek 
to recover any payments made in excess of those called for under 
the original contract.138  For agreements unsupported by 
additional consideration, Professor Johnson argues that his 
proposal for a self-help remedy would be effective because of the 
pre-existing duty rule.139  This rule provides that if the promisor 
in a modification did not provide something of additional value, 
the modification was not supported by consideration and was 
thus invalid.140  In applying the pre-existing duty rule to sports 
contracts, any contract where the player essentially forces the 
franchise to agree to the contract by leveraging his situation and 
threatening to hold out can be challenged by the franchise at a 
later time if the contract is not supported by additional 
consideration.141 
 
137  Johnson, supra note 51, at 92. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. at 93. 
140  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). 
141  See id. at § 89(a) (stating that “[a] promise modifying a duty under a 
contract not fully performed on either side is binding if the modification is fair 
and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the 
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Though it may be argued that for a franchise to acquiesce to 
the holdout’s demand, only to later seek to recover the difference 
between the original contract and modified contract, is a breach 
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied for every 
contract, this is not necessarily true.  First, and most 
importantly, the franchise’s maneuvering in acquiescing to the 
holdout’s demand is a direct result of the holdout’s breach of 
contract.  If the holdout’s breach is deemed to be a material 
breach, then, as mentioned earlier, the franchise is permitted to 
take steps in response, such as suspending its own 
performance.142  Second, for such a contract modification to take 
place, there must first be a contract to modify.  Even if the first 
contract has been breached, the contract may still be modified 
because a breach of contract does not necessitate a rescission of 
the contract, being that rescission requires both parties to agree 
to a discharge of the duties called for in the contract.143  The 
importance of there being a contract already in place is 
significant because in contesting the assertion that the franchise 
agreed to the modification in bad faith, the franchise can counter 
that the holdout negotiated in bad faith, because the holdout 
either withheld or threatened to withhold his unique skills until 
he was able to obtain the modification he desired.  With this 
being the case, the holdout’s bad faith challenge to the 
franchise’s later recourse may be dismissed by a court. 
Even if the modified contract was supported by additional 
consideration, such as the holdout’s contract getting extended, it 
is still possible for franchises to bring an action against the 
holdout after the holdout has fully performed through a claim of 
economic duress.144  To constitute duress, a manifestation of 
assent must be induced by an “improper threat” that leaves the 
victim “no reasonable alternative.”145  A threat is improper if it 
represents a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.146  
Thus, economic duress would render the contract voidable.147  A 
successful claim of duress requires a showing of three elements: 
 
contract was made”). 
142  See id. at § 237. 
143  See id. at § 283(1). 
144  Johnson, supra note 51, at 99.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 176 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
145  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
146  Id. at § 176(1)(d).  
147  Johnson, supra note 51, at 99. 
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(1) an improper threat; (2) the lack of a reasonable alternative; 
and (3) the inadequacy of ordinary remedies for breach.148  When 
a player holds out from his contract, the impropriety of the 
threat element is met because the “object [of the threat] is to 
extort more money from his employer for what is essentially 
little more than his already promised performance.”149  Further, 
even if the player does not explicitly threaten to breach his 
contract, duress can still be inferred from words or other 
conduct.150  Therefore, even if the player merely threatens to 
hold out, this could be enough for the franchise to bring an 
economic duress claim. 
Much like the improper threat element, the next two 
elements of economic duress are also likely met during a player 
holdout.  The lack of a reasonable alternative element is likely 
met because the type of personal service called for in a sports 
contract is the quintessential example of unique performance for 
which no true substitute exists, as no one player performs quite 
like another.151  In this manner, player contracts, due to their 
uniqueness, are akin to the performance contract Johanna 
Wagner signed, and later breached, which precipitated Lumley 
v. Wagner.152  Similarly, the inadequacy of ordinary remedies 
element is met because the only remedy traditionally available 
upon breach may be a negative injunction.153  However, the 
negative injunction does not provide adequate recompense to the 
club because the injunction merely prohibits the player from 
playing elsewhere. 
This resolution to the hold out dilemma is not without its 
obstacles.  With self-help specific performance, Professor 
Johnson identifies two main issues franchises may face: (1) the 
reluctance of the court to find that a sophisticated, wealthy, 
corporate defendant could be the victim of duress by an 
individual player; and (2) that the franchise did not affirm the 
modification of the player’s contract.154  The first obstacle can be 
 
148  Id. 
149  Id. at 100.  
150  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1981). 
151  Johnson, supra note 51, at 100–01. 
152  Lumley v. Wagner (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 687–99. 
153  See Rapp, supra note 86, at 262. 
154  Johnson, supra note 51, at 100-01.   
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overcome, however, through emphasizing the particular 
favorable circumstance the player finds himself in or 
highlighting the considerable bargaining power of a superstar 
player.155  Through this heightened bargaining power, premier 
players are typically able to get the contracts they want because 
the franchise does not want to risk those players withholding 
their services or demanding to play for a different franchise.  
Similarly, the second obstacle, the non-affirmance of the 
modification, can be overcome by the franchise showing that the 
franchise only briefly affirmed the contract and gave in to the 
player’s demand until the threat of the player withholding his 
services had subsided.156  In other words, the franchise can seek 
restitution for the “excess” payments as long as the franchise 
“disaffirms the modified contract within a ‘reasonable time.’”157  
While the term “reasonable time” is ambiguous, it likely means 
that the franchise can bring its economic duress claim against 
the player shortly after the time of the holdout’s threat has 
subsided.158 
A provision necessitating binding arbitration between the 
holdout and the franchise would be a topic that would be 
worthwhile considering during the next negotiating period for 
each league’s CBA because of the expedited—and fair—
resolution process that would take place between the player and 
the franchise.  However, if the players’ associations and the 
leagues are unable to agree to such a provision, the self-help 
specific performance remedy may be the best alternative for 
franchises to begin to shift the balance of power in professional 
athlete contract hold outs. 
 
 
155  Id. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. 
158  See id. 
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